THE FEARS OF THE NATION QUIETED; IN A LETTER TO A WHIG-GENTLEMAN.

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THE FEARS OF THE NATION QUIETED, &c.

SIR,

I Find by your laſt Letter, you are ſtill under ſome uneaſie Apprehenſions about the preſent Poſture of Affairs: And you ſeem to think, that notwithſtanding the *Peace*, we are not quite out of Danger.

For though it ſhould come to be as General a one, as ſome in their Addreſſes and Speeches affirmed it to be, long enough before there was much Likelyhood of it; yet if it be not with as general an Approbation, your Opinion is, that it can promiſe us no laſting Security.

And that *Peace*, you think, cannot be ſaid to be made with the general Approbation of *Allies*, which they come into with ſuch Reluctance and Diſſatisfaction, as ſhews plainly

they would not have ſubmitted to it, had they not been deſerted by one of the Parties concerned, or could they of themſelves, have been able to continue the War with the Enemy.

Now if the *Allies*, you ſay, ſhall be or have been, obliged to ſubmit to ſuch a *Peace* as they could get, becauſe they perceived, they were not in a Condition, without the Aſſiſtance of this *Nation*, to carry on the *War* againſt *France*; you ask what our State muſt be, if *France* ſhould hereafter pick a Quarrel with us, and we at that time, in our turn, be forſaken by all our *Allies?* You own yourſelf to be of the Number of thoſe timorous People, who think, that if the *Allies* are not able to defend themſelves againſt *France* without us, we ſhall be as little able without the *Allies*, to defend ourſelves againſt Her too: For if the whole Power of the *Allies*, when even *Spain* was in the ſame Intereſt, was not able to gain any very great Advantage over *France*, which was their Caſe in the War before the laſt; How ſhall any one of the *Allies* be ſufficient to ſupport itſelf againſt the whole Force of that Kingdom, when *Spain* is alſo united in Intereſt with it? And that this Nation of ours may be expoſed to the Danger of ſtruggling with its own Strength againſt the great Power of *France*, if it ſhould ever hereafter enter into its Thoughts to ſet the *Pretender*, or any *Popiſh Prince* upon our *Throne*, you are very apprehenſive. You think (if a *French* Monarch ſhould hereafter ariſe, of

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the ſame Politicks with ſome of his Predeceſſors) the whole *French* and *Spaniſh* Nation will be very ready to contribute all the Aſſiſtance they are able, to bring that Deſign about, which it will be ſo much for their Intereſt to effect. You mention beſides, two Reaſons, why our Anceſtors thought a certain Nation always would be our Enemy; the one is, that we are a *free People*; the other is, that we are *Proteſtants*; upon both which Accounts, they apprehended ſhe would be always ſetting herſelf to contrive and effect our Ruin, notwithſtanding any Promiſes or Engagements we may think her under to the contrary. As we are a *free People*, we have always been an Obſtacle to her Deſigns of *Univerſal Monarchy:* when our Neighbours have been invaded, and their Liberties in Danger, our Nation has always rouſed itſelf, and interpoſed to ſave them; as well knowing our Liberties could not long ſurvive the Loſs of theirs. This was our Caſe in the Time of K. *Charles* II. when the whole Nation, except the *Court*, was in the greateſt Conſternation at the mighty Progreſs of the *French* Arms in the *Netherlands:* And even that *Long Parliament*, which you ſay was as much a *Court Parliament*, and as much devoted to a *Miniſtry*, as ever any that had been before it, was ſo ſenſible of the Danger that threatened us, by the Ruin of our Neighbours, that they could not be diverted by all the moſt prevailing Arts and Intrigues of the Miniſtry, from Addreſſing

dreſſing the King to enter into ſtrict Alliances with the *States-General*, and then for declaring War againſt *France*. It was inſiſted upon in Parliament, *that an Alliance with* Holland *was moſt Expedient, for that we ſhould deceive ourſelves, if we thought we could be defended otherwiſe; we alone could not withſtand the* French, *Growth of Popery.* *his Purſe and Power was too great.* It was alſo, you ſay, moved at the ſame Time, that an *Alliance ſhould be made with the reſt of the Confederates, particularly with* Spain, *becauſe they were Owners of the* Netherlands, *for whoſe Preſervation we ought to have the greateſt Concern; that it is with* Spain, *that we have the moſt, if not the only profitable Trade, and the* Spaniards *were good, gallant, and ſure Friends.* If this was the Senſe of the Nation then, with relation to thoſe Alliances, you think you may juſtly condemn the Overſight of thoſe, who have imagined ſuch Alliances now, not worth keeping, and that our Intereſt in *Spain* might ſafely be given up: For you ſuppoſe, that if *Spain* is left in *French* Management, our Intereſt, as well as our Trade there, will ſoon come to nothing.

You ſay the *French* had as good an Underſtanding with our Court then, and made as great a Shew of Friendſhip to our Nation, as ever they have expreſs'd to any Court or Nation ſince, and yet that *Parliament*, notwithſtanding the many Courtiers and Penſioners that were believed to be in it, could not be prevailed with

to entertain any good Thoughts of that mutual Kindneſs and Familiarity. They were ſo jealous of thoſe ſhews of Friendſhips, that they thought them more dangerous than a State of *War*; and therefore they continued preſſing the King to enter into it, leſt the *Allies*, by our ſtanding out, ſhould be forced to conſent to an *Inſecure Peace*. And therefore, among other things in the Commons Addreſs to the *King*, it was mentioned, *that if for want of that timely Encouragement and Aſſiſtance, his Majeſty's joining with the States-General of the United Provinces, and other the Confederates would give them, the ſaid States, or any other conſiderable Part of the Confederates, ſhould this next Winter, or ſooner, make a Peace or Truce with the* French King *(the Prevention whereof, muſt hitherto be acknowledged a ſingular Effect of God's Goodneſs to us) which if it ſhould happen, his Majeſty would be afterwards neceſſitated with fewer, perhaps with no Alliances or Aſſiſtance, to withſtand the Power of the* French King, *which hath ſo long and ſo ſucceſsfully contended with ſo many and ſo Potent Adverſaries, and whilſt he continues, his over-ballancing Greatneſs muſt always be dangerous to his Neighbours, ſince he would be able to oppreſs any one Confederate, before the reſt could get together, and be in ſo good a Poſture of offending him, as they now are, being jointly engaged in a War. And if he ſhould be ſo ſucceſsful as to make a Peace,*

or disunite the present Confederation against him, it was much to be feared, whether ever it would be possible to re-unite it; at least, it would be a Work of so much Time and Difficulty, as would leave his Majesty's Kingdoms exposed to much Misery and Danger.

The Commons you say, were then so intent on prosecuting the Ends of that Address, that *when several Bills were moved for to be read, the Members generally said, No, they would proceed on nothing but the French and Popery.*

But besides, the Apprehensions the Nation then had of the Power of *France*, the *Commons* were very sensible, that our *Trade* with them was very prejudicial to us. *For it had been made appear in Parliament, upon the Ballance of the French Trade, that the Nation was detrimented yearly* 900000 l. *or a Million, the Value of the Goods imported from* France, *annually so much exceeding that of the Goods exported hence thither, whereby it is evident, that such a Sum of the Treasure and Money of the Nation, was yearly exhausted and carried into* France, *and all this by unnecessary Wines, Silks, Ribbons, Feathers,* &c. *The saving and retrenching of which Expence, would in a great Degree, serve to maintain the Charge of a War.* And therefore it was said, *that though at a Treaty of Peace between* France *and the Confederates, it could be supposed (which was not credible) that* France *should be prevailed with to deliver up all* Lorrain, Flanders,

Ibid.

ders, Alſatia *and other Conquer'd places are we ſafe? No, he has too many Hands, too much Money, and this Money is in a great meaſure (a Million Sterling yearly, at leaſt) ſupply'd him from hence. We muſt depreſs him by Force, as far as may be, but farther, we muſt have Leagues and Laws to Impoveriſh him; we muſt deſtroy the* French *Trade: This would quiet and ſecure us; this would make our Lands riſe, and this would enable us to ſet the Kingdom at eaſe.* It was alſo urged, *that the Debate of that Day, was as great and weighty, as ever was any in* England, *for it Concerned our very Being, and included our Religion, Liberty, and Property; and therefore it was warmly inſiſted on, that the Door towards* France *ſhould be ſhut and guarded; for ſo long as it was open, our Treaſure and Trade would creep out, and their Religion creep in at it.*

Growth of Popery, *p.* 145.

p. 129.

But you own, that notwithſtanding this Zeal in the Houſe of *Commons* againſt the *French King*, and the juſt Apprehenſions they had, of the Nation's Danger from his Power and greatneſs, the *Court* was not to be prevailed with to alter their Meaſures: And inſtead of our *King's* entering into ſuch Alliances, or into a War againſt *France*, as the *Parliament* deſired; it was alledg'd by the Courtiers, and afterwards by the *King* himſelf; That the *Commons* Addreſs was an Invaſion *upon his Majeſty's Prerogative of making Peace and War; and that no Condition ſhould make him depart*

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from, or leſſen ſo eſſential a Part of the Monarchy.

But you ſay, for obviating all ſuch kind of Apprehenſions, it was then ſhewn, that the *Prerogative of the Crown was not at all intrench'd upon; they did not, nor did they pretend to treat or make Alliances; they only offer'd their Advice about them, and left it with the King, who might do as he pleaſed, either make or not make them. It was no more than other Perſons might do to the King; doubtleſs the Privy Council might adviſe him in this particular, and why not his great Council? This rate of Diſcourſe would make the King's Prerogative conſiſt meerly in not being adviſed by his Parliament (of all People.)*

p. 141.

It was urged there were manifold Precedents of ſuch Advices: Leagues have been made by Advice of *Parliament*, and have been ratified in *Parliament*, in *Edw.* III. *Rich.* II. *and eſpecially in* Henry the V*th's Time, and particularly with* Sigiſmund *the Emperor and King of the* Romans; *and* Henry *the* V*th was a Magnanimous Prince, and not to be impos'd upon.* 18. Jac. *The Parliament adviſed the King about making and managing a War: And we may well remember our own adviſing the firſt* Dutch *War, and making Leagues was leſs than War: But if there was no Preſident in this particular Caſe, it was no objection, for Matter of Advice is not to be Circumſcribed by Precedent.*

But indeed the true Reaſon, why that Advice was ſaid to be an Invaſion on the *Prerogative*, was,

was, becauſe the Nature of the Advice was diſliked by that Court: For the Court, you ſay, was too much in the Intereſt of *France* and *Popery*, to be brought into any Meaſures of depreſſing them: And you cite to this purpoſe, *your Growth of Popery*, *p.* 120. where 'tis ſaid at the ſame Moment of the Parliament's riſing, a *Grand* French *Ambaſſador was coming over. For all Things betwixt* France *and* England *moved with that punctual Regularity, that it was like the Harmony of the Spheres, ſo conſonant with themſelves, although we cannot hear the Muſick.*

For there landed immediately after the receſs, the Duke of Crequy, *the Archbiſhop of* Rheims, *Monſieur* Barillon, *and a Train of three or four Hundred Perſons of all Qualities, ſo that the Lords Spiritual and Temporal of* France, *with ſo many of the Commons, meeting the King at* New-Market, *it looked like another Parliament, and that the* Engliſh *had been adjourned in order to their better reception: But what Addreſs they made to his Majeſty, or what Acts they paſſed, hath not yet been publiſhed; thoſe that have been in Diſcourſe, were,*

An Act for Continuing his Majeſty's Subjects in the Service of France.

An Act of Abolition of all Claims and Demands from the Subjects of France, *on Account of all Prizes made of the* Engliſh *at Sea, ſince the Year* 1644, *till that day, and for the future.*

An Act for a further Supply of French *Money.*

But, that Author ſays, *becauſe it appears not that all theſe and many others of more ſecret Na-*

ture passed the Royal Assent, it sufficeth thus far to have mentioned them: Only it is most certain, that although the English *Parliament was kept aloof from the Business of War, Peace, and Alliance, as improper for their intermeddling and presumptuous; yet with these three Estates of* France, *all these Things were Negotiated and Transacted in the greatest Confidence. And so they were adjourned from* New-Market *to* London, *and there continued till the Return of the* English *Parliament; when they were dismissed home with all the signs and demonstrations of mutual Satisfaction.*

This mighty Intimacy between the two Courts of *England* and *France*, you observe, was the Reason of the *Allies* accepting such a Peace as they could get, which they would not have complied with, had there been the same propensity in the Court of *England*, as there was in the People of *England*, to help them: For had the King complyed with the Desires of his Parliament, it would have changed *the Face of Affairs in Christendome:* As the Prince of *Orange* then told Sir *William Temple*, Memoirs *p.* 36. *And the War might have been carried on, till* France *had yielded to the Treaty of the* Pyrenees, *and left the World in quiet for the rest of our lives.*

But though the *Peace* then made, was neither very Safe, nor Lasting, through the great Care taken by our Court not to offend the Court of *France*, which you think has occasioned all the disquiet given to *Europe* this last twenty

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Years: Yet you allow the *Peace* then made, was upon better Terms than it would otherwiſe have been, through the eager Diſpoſition of the People of *England* to enter into the War. For *France* could not but be apprehenſive, that the general Inclination of the People, muſt at laſt oblige the Court of *England* to comply, however averſe it was, to the War: And this certainly induced *France* to come more eaſily into a Peace, which, though it was very advantageous for Her, would not have contented her, but for the Fears of a ſtronger Alliance, if *England* ſhould be brought into it.

This diſpoſition there was then in the People of *England*, to prevent the *Exorbitant Power of France*, and which will always continue to be in a *Free People*, while they have Senſe enough left to perceive their Danger, will, you ſay, ſufficiently inſtruct the Court of *France*, to make uſe of all ſorts of Methods to rob us of our Freedom. You ſeem to be of Opinion, that if the People of *England* had been of the ſame Sentiments with the Court at that Time, and had had no greater Fears of the Greatneſs of *France*; all *Europe* at that very juncture, had been in the utmoſt danger of being ſwallowed up by her. And therefore you bid me imagine, that if the Sentiments of the People of *England* can be altered, with Relation to their Dangers from *France*, her greateſt Obſtacle to *univerſal Monarchy* is removed: For you think if *England* can be brought into a *French* Intereſt, or be perſuaded to ſtand Neuter,

Neuter, the reſt of the *Allies* will be too weak to oppoſe her Power, eſpecially now ſhe has *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies* to ſupport her; which were wont to make uſe of their Strength and Wealth againſt her.

You ſay the Deluſion ſome Nations have been in, has given her as fair a handle as ſhe need wiſh, for compaſſing her Deſigns, and you think ſhe will ſpare neither Promiſes nor Money, to continue them in the ſame State. You ſay the Safety of our *Nation* has hitherto been preſerved by keeping a jealous Eye over *France*, and in not confiding ſo much in its Promiſes, as in its want of Power to do us miſchief.

You think, therefore, if we are become more ſecure in our own Opinion, than our Anceſtors uſed to think themſelves, when its Power was much leſs conſiderable than at preſent; 'tis too manifeſt, that we are ſome way or other deluded, and are more guided by bare Words and Promiſes, than by the real State of Things. You obſerve that the *Huguenots* were moſt effectually ruined by truſting to Aſſurances; and that others that truſt to them, may in all likelyhood be equally Infatuated to their Ruin.

You imagine beſides, that we have been ſo far deluded, as to give a handle to the Grand Monarch, for effecting the Deſigns he may have upon our Liberty, by ſome Notions that have of late mightily prevailed amongſt us, which are thoſe of *Hereditary unalienable Right*, and *unlimited Paſſive Obedience*. Now (*you think*) he undoubtedly underſtands theſe Terms (ſo often

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made uſe of in *Addreſſes*, and upon other occaſions) in the ſame Senſe as they formerly were underſtood to ſignifie amongſt us. Now *Hereditary Right* was always heretofore underſtood to ſignifie the *Right* of the Next in Blood, and this was according to ſome Men's Notions, ſo unalienable a *Right*, that no human Authority could ſet it aſide: And if any human Authority did pretend to do this, their *Acts* were look'd upon by all the Sticklers for the Notions, to be *ipſo facto*, *null and void*. This (you ſay) was the way of Arguing about *Hereditary Right*, at the Time of the Bill of Excluſion. And no doubt the Friends of the *French* King aſſure him, that this is the Senſe which the People that now uſe it mean by it.

And as for *Paſſive Obedience*, (you ſay,) the meaning of it uſed to be, when it was a mark of Diſtinction of Parties, a quiet and ſubmiſſive Behaviour of Subjects, under the moſt *arbitrary* and unjuſt Uſage of their tyrannical Governors; the natural Inference from which Notion is the condemning all that *Reſiſtance* of King *James* at the *Revolution*, and making all the *Acts* and Settlements ſubſequent upon it, illegal and unjuſtifiable. In this Senſe the *Jacobites* now underſtand it, and look upon all thoſe as their Friends, notwithſtanding all the Oaths they have taken ſince the *Revolution*. that join in maintaining this Doctrine. Now, (you ſuppoſe,) that theſe Doctrines are underſtood in *France* as well as in *England*; that they are there univerſally

verſally believed to be Sound and Orthodox Doctrines, and, that the Aſſerters and Defenders of them, ought to be encouraged and ſupported in other Countries, as well as their own. And (you believe,) it is both the Principle and Policy of our *Popiſh* Enemies, to aſſiſt the maintainers of ſuch Doctrines, where they have Power, and where it is for their Intereſt to do it. You obſerve, that *France* has always cultivated a Correſpondence and Friendſhip with Men of thoſe Principles amongſt us, and has ever thought *itſelf* moſt ſecure, when their Intereſt was moſt prevailing.

From whence you argue, that the *French* K. may poſſibly take every opportunity that offers itſelf, to ſerve and oblige the Eſpouſers of thoſe Opinions, and that he cannot do a thing more beneficial to himſelf, or more obliging to them, than the uſing his beſt Endeavours to ſet *One* upon our Throne, that he believes to have an *Hereditary Right*, and who muſt now have been in Poſſeſſion of it, had the Doctrines of *Paſſive Obedience* and *Non Reſiſtance* been faithfully adher'd to. If then he finds the Contenders for theſe Notions ſo Numerous amongſt us, what can he think their Aim to be, but at the ſame End, with what he would willingly propoſe, the bringing *him* in to be *King* over us, whom he has ſo long owned and acknowledged for our *lawful Sovereign*? And no doubt he will uſe all his Might to effect it, when he believes according to what he takes to be the natural Conſequence of their

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Aſſertions, that he ſhall find ſo many Encouragers and Abettors of his Undertakings.

And if he can effect this, he will then be able to make *England* as Servile a Country as his own; and he is very ſenſible, that as we loſe our Liberty, our Enmity to his Country will wear off; at leaſt it will be no longer terrible to them, and it will be in no Condition to give him Diſturbance in the Proſecution of his other Deſigns. You conclude therefore, That as we are a *free People*, he will never think himſelf ſecure while we enjoy our Ancient *Liberty*, that has rendered us ſo brave and rich a People, that has made us heretofore ſo formidable Abroad, and our *Alliance* and Friendſhip ſo much courted and eſteemed by our Neighbours. And may not the *French* King, you ſay, fairly Promiſe himſelf a very good Aſſiſtance, if it is given out, that his Deſign is only to maintain and eſtabliſh the Doctrines of *Hereditary Right*, and *Paſſive Obedience*, and to root out the contrary Principles amongſt us, as deſtructive of all *Monarchical Government*? Muſt not all the warm Contenders for thoſe Doctrines, encourage ſuch a laudable Deſign; eſpecially when it will end in the utter Extirpation of *Revolution Principles*, which they have always ſeemed more to abominate, and have expreſſed much more Zeal againſt, than ever they have done againſt *Popiſh Tyranny and Perſecution*? And beſides, will not their open avowed Declaration in behalf of thoſe Doctrines, if they underſtand them in the

Senſe they uſed to be underſtood in, oblige them in Conſcience to join with thoſe that offer to produce thoſe that have an *Hereditary Right*, and to oppoſe thoſe that don't pretend to ſuch a *Right*? It will be in vain (you think) for theſe Men to ſay, that they don't believe the *Hereditary Right*, which the *French* have acknowledg'd, and may juſtly come to ſupport by force of Arms. For if any Perſon lays Claim to an *Hereditary Right*, and brings Proofs to confirm that *Right*, the Advocates for ſuch a *Right* in general, muſt join in Defence of it, if they can't diſprove it. So that either they muſt not believe their Doctrines, or their Conſciences will oblige them to ſtand up in the Defence of them, againſt all Oppoſers whatſoever. And how many of this Sort there are, you bid me only look into the *Addreſſes* and *Sermons* that have been preached and received in the Nation with Applauſe, to judge.

But after all, you own that the *States*, and the other *Allies*, will not ſtand ſtill and look on, while we are over-run by a *French Power*; but then you ask in the firſt Place, whether 'tis not poſſible their Hands may be employ'd at the very Time in their own Defence; and whether the *French* may not at the ſame time, be able to invade us with 40 or 50 *Thouſand Men*, and keep the *States* and others of the *Allies* ſo in Awe, with 150, or 200 *Thouſand more*, that they ſhall have Work enough to defend their own *Territories*, without offe-

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ting to concern themſelves in protecting their Neighbours? Beſides, you ſuppoſe it not impoſſible, that a *French* Intereſt may ſo prevail in other Countries, as may prevent all manner of Aſſiſtance from being ſent to us. They may inſinuate among their People, that tho' our Intereſt and theirs is inſeparable, and that if we are ruined, their Deſtruction will ſoon follow after; yet that they ought not to impoveriſh themſelves by an *unneceſſary* Expence; that we are of our ſelves, a rich and populous Country, and may be able to provide for our own Security, without intereſting others in our Quarrel; that they have been exhauſted by a long and expenſive War, and cannot unneceſſarily engage in a new one; and that as we drew our ſelves out of the *Confederacy*, when we were leſſer able to carry on the *War*, than any of the *Allies* that continued it, ſo they can ſee as little Reaſon to come into our Aſſiſtance, ſince they are ſo little able to bear the Charge of it, and ſince it was as much our Intereſt not to have deſerted them and the *Common Cauſe*, as it can be their Intereſt to join in preſerving us. Such ſort of Arguments you think a *French Faction* may make uſe of to divert any of the *Allies* from engaging in our Behalf; and you know not but they may have their Influence among People already tired out with heavy Taxes.

But laſt of all, You ſuppoſe they may have a Notion, that their Aſſiſtance may not be acceptable, and may rather be a Diſſervice than

an Advantage to our Affairs. For great Numbers of the Nation ſeemed not long ſince, to have a much greater Averſion to the *Dutch*, than to the *French*; and to be more eaſie at the Thoughts of beginning a War with the *States*, than of continuing the War againſt *France*. And however impoſſible they might think it to bear any more Taxes, in Conjunction with the Confederates, to bring down the Power of *France*, they could very readily imagine themſelves in a Condition to contend with the *Dutch*. And therefore if the *Dutch* ſhould ſend over any of their Forces to our Aſſiſtance, in Caſe of a foreign Invaſion in favour of the *Pretender*, thoſe that have ſuch Sentiments of the *Dutch*, might perhaps out of very Spite and Hatred eſpouſe the oppoſite Side, and rather than owe their Preſervation once more to ſuch *Republicans*, throw themſelves into the Hands of the *Grand Monarch*. You ask, if there have not of late been very particular Regards expreſs'd to the *French*, not only more than to the *Dutch*, but in oppoſition to them and their Intereſt? Have not *Alliances* been broke with the latter, for no other Reaſon but to oblige and gratify the former? Have not Armies been kept from Action contrary to Promiſe, Forces been unexpectedly withdrawn, Enemies Towns ſaved, and the Towns of the *Allies* ſeized by Surpriſe, with an apparent Deſign to relieve the ſinking State of *France*, and to make it an Over-match for all the *Confederates*? ——Have not the *French*,

you

you ask, been of late more inſulting towards the *Allies*, and are not they grown higher in their Demands upon them, on Account of the Intereſt they think they have in us? And have not they ſpoke openly in one of the *Paris Gazett's*, of one particular Advantage of our Friendſhip, which perhaps it would have been more decent in them to have kept more a Secret, which was, *As our Men of War were to be laid up, our Seamen would have leave to enter into the* French *Service*, which is a Favour, which our Nation formerly, when it valued it ſelf upon its Dominion at *Sea*, would not have been very eaſy in granting?

Now then if this be the Caſe; if the *Dutch* are apprehenſive, that the People are better affected in general to the *French* than to them, they would have little Encouragement to come to our Aſſiſtance, where more might look upon them as *Enemies* than as *Friends*. But however this may be, you ſuppoſe the *French* will grow ſo formidable by their vaſt Encreaſe of *Trade* and *Money*, which they will endeavour to ingroſs by their Intereſt in *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies*, that after they have brought the *Allies* to ſubmit to their Terms of Peace, they will reduce many of their Neighbours, to ſo low a Condition without a War, that few of them will be in Power or Heart to begin a new one, whatever Provocations may be given them; and they will be the leſs inclined, and leſs able to enter upon a *new War*, if after the Peace, they ſhould disband

ſuch

ſuch a Number of their *Forces* as we did before it. Should the *French*, you ſay, after the *Peace*, if a Vacancy ſhould happen in our Throne, endeavour to give ſuch a Succeſſor to us, as we are made to believe the *French* King promiſed King *James* he would do, as far as lay in his Power; the *Allies* without ſuch a ſtanding Force, as the *French* keep up in Time of the profoundeſt Peace, will be very unprepared to relieve us. Our Nation within is ſo naked and defenceleſs, that ſhould an Invader be able to get footing upon it, he will ſoon over-run it, if an equal or ſuperior Force is not immediately brought to oppoſe him; ſo that if the *French* are the Aggreſſors, and come upon us with a greater Force than the *Allies* have in readineſs to produce for our Service, you think our Condition will ſoon become very deſperate. We have indeed Bodies of Men enough among our ſelves, to form as great an Army as can be brought to invade us, but it requires Time to make Men Soldiers; and an undiſciplined Mob, tho' they may be able to put People ſometimes in a Fright, and burn *Meeting-Houſes*, will ſignifie little againſt a well diſciplin'd regular Force, though it ſhould prove to be not a tenth Part of their Number. So that *France*, lying very near us, and able in Time of Peace to keep up a vaſt ſtanding Force, will be in much greater Readineſs to diſturb our Quiet, than any of the *Allies* can be in to ſecure it, and may do us a hundred times more Miſchief after the *War*, than it could have done

done by ten Years longer Continuance of it, ſhould ſo long a Time have been neceſſary for the reſtoring the *Balance of Power*.

You allow, that we ſhall keep up a larger *Army*, either at Home or Abroad, after this Peace than after the laſt; but then you ask, to what Purpoſe are more Forces to be kept in pay? Sure it can't be only to put the Nation to greater Charge? And yet if the Peace is likely to prove ſo good an one as ſome wou'd perſuade us it is, it ought to be laſting, and therefore ſhould not require a ſtanding Force to preſerve it. Why are we to have Forces in *Port-Mahon* and *Gibraltar*, or in any Places Abroad, if we are in no Danger of being diſturbed by *France* in our *Trade*, or otherways, after the *Peace*? If we are to enjoy a *Secure Peace*, that may be an unneceſſary Expence: If it is not likely to be a ſecure One, we ought, you think, to have continu'd the *War*, till ſuch an one could have been obtained. And you think ſuch a *Peace* might have been had, if *Orders* had been ſent but the very laſt Year of the War, (or not ſent to the contrary) to proſecute it with the ſame Vigour it had been proſecuted in the preceding *Campaigns*; and for which *Taxes* were given with a more liberal Hand than ever. You think at that Time *France* was brought ſo low, and its frontier Towns ſo much in Danger, that had either *Cambray* or *Arras* been taken, which they muſt unavoidably have been, if the Armies had acted in Conjunction, the

Country

Country would have lain ſo open and expoſed, that *France* muſt have accepted ſuch a Peace, as wou'd have made all the *Allies* eaſy and ſecure, and that End of the *War* obtain'd, for which ſuch a Confederacy was made at the beginning of it, as you fear can never be made again, if the War be ended, to the Diſſatisfaction of any of the Powers concern'd it it.

You ſay, the Reaſon for juſtifying the Orders which were ſent againſt joining with the Confederates in Battle or *Siege*, was that the Peace was juſt upon being brought to a Concluſion, which was almoſt a Year before even a ſeparate one was publickly concluded. Indeed, if the *Allies* had approved of the Terms, ſuch a Reaſon you think might have been allowed of. But if there were Terms agreed to by two or three People, acting in the Name of *One* of the Confederate Powers, without the Knowledge or Conſent of any of the other *Allies*, ſuch a Reaſon you won't allow to be urg'd for a Juſtification. 'Tis certain, the Power that ſeemed to embrace and inſiſt upon ſuch Terms of *Peace* as ſatisfactory, might be allowed to be moſt conſiderable of all the *Confederates*, and to have done moſt in the Proſecution of the *War*, and therefore might be thought excuſable if it took moſt upon it, in preſcribing Terms of *Peace*. But then that Power took ſuch a Share and Expence of the *War* by *Conſent and Agreement*; it thought it ſelf beſt able, and was really as much concerned

cerned in the Event of the War, if not more as to its *Trade*, as alſo to its *Succeſſion*, its *Religion* and *Liberties*, than any of the *Confederates*, and therefore it came freely into the *Alliance*: And you think it ought no more to have broke from the *Alliance*, or to have preſcribed any *Terms* contrary to the Conditions and Ends ſpecified in it, than any of the leſſer *States* or *Potentates* concerned. And if after this, a general Peace be made, which is not with the joint Satisfaction of the *Allies*, that Power, which by deſerting them in the War, forced them to come into the Peace, muſt not boaſt of being over true to them in either; eſpecially when that Power is better able to continue the War, than any of the *Allies* engaged in it, and might, by its hearty Concurrence one Year more, have probably ended it to the general Satisfaction of the whole *Alliance*.

That Power then, you think, which hearkens to the Propoſals of its Enemies in Time of *War*, contrary to its Promiſes and Engagements enter'd into with its Friends, muſt not conclude that it can be always ſecure after it.

Some Nations can never be relied upon; there is no Safety for us but in their Want of *Power*: And if our *Allies* are diſguſted, they will be leſs willing to join any more with us.

Your Opinion is, therefore, that nothing leſs than an abſolute Inability to purſue the *War* any longer, can be alledged in Excuſe for any of the *Confederates* breaking off from the reſt, before their Enemies be reduced within thoſe

due Bounds, that there can be no neceſſity of uniting all the other Powers of *Europe* to keep them quiet for the future.

You obſerve, that one of the great Ends of entering into this War, was, the obtaining the *Balance of Power*, and by this *Balance*, you underſtand the reducing a State already too great, to an Equality of *Power* with ſome one of its Neighbours; for you cannot think that to be a *Balance* of Power, when ſeveral *States* and *Potentates*, united together in a Confederacy, are become by that means but equal to a ſingle over-grown Prince, who could ſoon overrun and ſubdue any of their Dominions without ſuch a Confederated Strength againſt him: But then only you will allow there is a *Balance*, when two of the greateſt *Powers* in the ſame Part of the World are ſo near equal in Strength, that a third Neighbouring Power can turn the Superiority on either Side. As it was in the Time of the Emperor *Charles* V. and *Francis* I. of *France*, when our *Henry* the VIII*th* ſiding with either of thoſe contending Princes could turn the Scale to his Advantage. Was the preſent *Emperor* ſo near equal in Strength to the *French* King, that either *We* or the *Dutch* joining with one of them, could change Affairs in his Favour, the Balance of Power then would be reſtored: But if *France* be a Match for the Emperor and Empire, for the *Dutch* and *Savoy*, and even when theſe are aſſiſted with other Powers, we muſt not ſay that we can preſerve the Balance of Power in *Europe*, though our coming in to either

either Side ſhould make it ſuperior: For a Confederacy can never be ſaid to make a *Balance*; they cannot long be kept together; they may have different Views and Intereſts in proſecuting or continuing the War; they may be bought off, or Factions and Diviſions among themſelves may diſunite them; ſo that a *Balance* made up of a Confederacy, is precarious, and not to be depended on: And if we have no Hopes of preſerving a Balance againſt *France*, but by the uniting of ſeveral Powers againſt her, we have but little Reaſon to expect ever to ſee it effected: We may amuſe ourſelves with calling this a *Balance*, but it is really no more than an Amuſement. People may fancy, you ſay, that all the Powers of *Europe* will unite againſt *France*, in caſe ſhe ſhould encroach upon any of her Neighbours; but though it would be for the Intereſt of the reſt of *Europe*, to make themſelves of a Party with their Neighbours, if *France* ſhould hereafter inſult or injure them; yet how very often is it, that People do not ſee their own Intereſt? And how difficult is it to perſuade People of different Kingdoms, to act with equal Spirit and Vigour, if a Danger does not equally threaten them? You ſuppoſe for Inſtance, that *France* ſhould take all Methods after a *Peace*, to ruin our Trade, eſpecially with *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies*, that it ſhould hinder our Vending our Manufactures, as we uſed to do, to any of the *Spaniſh* Dominions, by taking care itſelf to ſupply them with every Thing they want of that kind; and ſhould

prevent our receiving any *Bullion* in Exchange for our Goods; by which means, our *Trade* and *Wealth* would ſo much decreaſe, that we ſhould ſoon grow Impoveriſh'd; the moſt effectual Way that *France* can take to ruin us: To whom, in ſuch a Caſe, can we complain? Or of whom can we expect Relief? Who is there of all the *Confederates* that will think themſelves concerned to begin a New War upon this Account? Or if they would concern themſelves in our Quarrel, how ſhould we expect to have it managed ſo Vigorouſly, as if we ourſelves were able to keep *France* to performance of Conditions with us? Should the *Peace* be ſo much to the Satisfaction of all the *Allies*, that all of them ſhould be perſuaded to become mutual *Guarantees* of every Article of it, (which is what we don't ſeem to deſire or to think we want) yet perhaps, all of them won't think that the Loſs of our *Trade* is a Breach of any Article of Peace, eſpecially if it ſhall be ſaid on the Parts of *France* and *Spain*, That there had been no Prohibition of Trade with us, That we were free to carry any of our Goods or Manufactures, to ſuch of their Dominions, as we formerly were; but if *Spain* preferr'd *French* Manufactures to Ours, and had rather they ſhould have their *Gold* and *Silver* in Exchange for them, than we, it is what they might Lawfully do, without any Breach of their Agreements with us.

Such Pretences and Excuſes, you ſay, may be made, upon this occaſion, that no *Confederacy* can

can be formed, that will enter into a new *War*, to regain our *Trade* for us, if *France* is not firſt reduced to ſuch a Condition, as a War may be made with her without running any great Riſque in it. Which cannot be done, if *France* at a *Peace* is left Superior to any two or three Powers in *Europe*.

What you think would have come neareſt to the eſtabliſhing a Balance of Power in *Europe*, was, the putting the Emperor in the Poſſeſſion of all the *Spaniſh Dominions*, not that you think even this would make a juſt *Balance* againſt *France*, becauſe in the late King of *Spain*'s Time, when the Strength of *Spain* was added to the Confederacy, *France* proved ſuch a *Match* for all their united Forces, that very little Advantage was gained over her in that War; and it is certain, that if the preſent Emperor was put in Poſſeſſion of all the Dominions the late King of *Spain* was poſſeſſed of, that if he was left after this to ſtand ſingly againſt the *Power of France*, he would prove too weak to oppoſe it; and if he could not form a new Confederacy to ſupport him, he would in all probability in a few Years, be drove by the *French* out of all his Dominions.

But yet if the whole *Spaniſh Dominions* had been put into the *Emperor*'s Hands, to whom they of right did belong, and for the effecting which, the *Grand Alliance* was chiefly formed, that would have bid the faireſt for eſtabliſhing a Balance of *Power*, of any Model that you can think of. For in ſuch a Caſe, as the Emperor

peror would have been much nearer an equal Match to *France*, than he can be without them; ſo we ſhould have had ſo much greater Advantages of the *Spaniſh Trade*, had the Emperor been Maſter of *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies*, than ever we can propoſe to have, now they are in the Hands of one of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, that we ſhould upon all Occaſions have made it our Buſineſs to ſupport him. Our Intereſt would have been ſo nearly link'd together, by the Uſe he would have had of *Ours* and the *Dutch* Shipping, and the great Advantages we ſhould have reap'd from our Trade to *Spain*, which muſt have been chiefly ours and the *Dutch*, on the Account of the Succours we had given him in the War, and alſo becauſe of our being highly neceſſary to him afterwards, that *France* could not have begun a War with the *Emperor*, without our being engaged in the Quarrel.

Beſides, as the *Mines* belonging to *Spain*, are the Fountains from which all the other Parts of *Europe* chiefly draw their Wealth, and by their Supplies from which, they are enabled to carry on a Trade to the *Eaſt-Indies*, and other Parts of the World, ſo had they fallen to the Share of the Emperor, they would have brought ſuch an Acceſſion of Wealth to the Emperor and his *Allies*, that they would mightily have encreas'd their Power, and would have kept *France* ſo much in Awe, that ſhe would have had little ſtomach to begin a new Quarrel with them; and ſo they might have been quiet for Ages to come.

But

But ſince *Spain* is now wreſted out of the hands of the Emperor, and given to one of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, you fanſie it is in vain to think of ever ſeeing a *Balance* againſt *France*, which is already much too ſtrong for any ſingle Power in *Europe*.

Was *Spain* pretty near an equal Match for *France*, you own you ſhould not be ſo apprehenſive of Danger; though there was nearneſs of Blood in the Poſſeſſors of each Crown, yet they would be jealous of each others Rights, and one would do all in his Power to be independent on the other. But as *Spain* is vaſtly Inferior in Strength to *France*; ſo will ſhe not offer to contend with her, but muſt ſubmit to any Condition that the other will preſcribe. And was not *Spain* deſigned to be in a dependance upon *France*, it is abſurd to ſuppoſe, that the latter ſhould have been at the vaſt Expences this War has coſt her. The King of *France* is too politick a Prince to run ſuch hazards, and to waſte ſuch Treaſures as he has done, for the Sake of his *Grandſon*, if he had not propoſed ſome very great Advantages to his own Kingdoms by it. For was *Spain* intended to be as much independent on *France* under one of the Houſe of *Bourbon*, as it was under the Princes of the Houſe of *Auſtria*, you cannot be perſuaded, that the *French* King would have broke his ſolemn Treaties, and have entred into the *War*, to ſupport his Pretenſions. But as it has been all along the Politicks of *France*, to bring

bring *Spain* under its Power, in order to eſtabliſh that *univerſal Monarchy*, it has many Years been aiming at; ſo there is no Senſe in imagining that ſhe would have undertook the War upon any other View. While the preſent *French* King lives, there can be no imagining, that *Spain* will endeavour to get from under his Dominion and Direction; his demand upon *Spain* is ſo great, for the Debt he muſt have contracted during this War, which, the *French* King acknowledges in the Preamble of the Entry of the late *Renunciations*, was undertaken for the ſettling his Grandſon on the Throne of *Spain*, that the Mortgaging all the *Mines* of the *Weſt-Indies*, will not be able to pay it during his Reign, ſhould he live half as many Years as he has lived already. And who of the *Allies* are there, if they are able, that will endeavour to relieve *Spain* in its State of dependency, when it is ſaid to be only for the ſatisfying ſo vaſt and juſt a Debt, as Two or Three *hundred Millions* Sterling, which *France* may pretend this War hath coſt her?

Nor do you think the Caſe would be much alter'd, if the preſent *Dauphin* ſhould ſurvive his great Grandfather; for the preſent King would have ſo much regard for the laſting Glory of his Arms and Politicks, as to leave things in ſuch a State, that *Spain* ſhould not be able to releaſe itſelf from its Subjection to *France*.

But what you think moſt likely is, that the *Dauphin* will never live to be *King*, or however, not to be long ſo, and then the Succeſſion

to the Crown of *France* will devolve upon *Philip* of *Spain* as next Heir, which you think he will accept of, upon the Offer of the *French* Nation, which they will certainly make him, if it appears for their Intereſt to do it, and then *Spain* will be moſt effectually reduced to a perpetual dependance on the Crown of *France*.

You ſuppoſe, that the breaking in upon *Renunciations*, will no more trouble the Conſcience of King *Philip*, than it has done that of his Grandfather; and that as the Grandfather has ſhewn no remorſe or repentance for his frequent Violations of ſuch kind of Ties and Engagements, ſo neither does he expect or intend that his *Grandſon* ſhould think them more Sacred. Nor do you believe, that any ſenſible Man, even among the *Tories*, that underſtands any thing of Hiſtory, does really perſuade himſelf that he will.

All that can be ſuppoſed is, That the Dukes of *Berry* and *Orleans*, will prevent *Philip*'s return into *France*, by keeping the Succeſſion in themſelves; and that you allow they will take the beſt Methods they are able to effect it. But yet you ſay, if the *French* Nation think it for their Intereſt, to keep *Spain* under the Power of *France*, they will certainly ſtand by *Philip*, as the moſt certain way of ſecuring it. And therefore they will moſt undoubtedly bring it about, notwithſtanding all the Efforts that thoſe two Princes can make to oppoſe it. So that take what View we pleaſe on the Face of Affairs; you are confident, that the Power

of *France*, as *Spain* is now and ever like to be in a dependance upon it, threatens inevitable Danger to the reſt of *Europe*, and in the firſt Place to our ſelves.

If the Grand Monarch's Deſigns to ſet a *Pretender* over us, ſhould not ſuceed, which you think he will undoubtedly attempt with all his Might, as being of the greateſt Conſequence to him, and which he will bid the fairer for, when he ſhall have no other immediate Diverſion for all his numerous Forces; yet ſhould he miſcarry in this, you ſay, he may find ſuch Ways of bringing us low, by the Power he will have of ruining our *Trade*, that in Time we muſt of Courſe fall a Prey to his Ambition or his Revenge. Both of which will puſh him on to make an end of us, at leaſt to prevent our ever being more a *free* People; that Freedom which we have hitherto enjoy'd, having always kept us jealous of his Deſigns, when he moſt profeſs'd himſelf our Friend, and in any Conteſts with him, made us appear the moſt terrible Enemies.

But you go on to ſay, that the ſpight he bears to our *Religion* as well as our *Liberties*, will ſet him upon trying all Methods to deſtroy us, which Force or *Policy* can furniſh him with. There is hardly any thing to which he has more ſacrificed his Word, than to the promoting the Intereſt of his *Religion*. Notwithſtanding all the Obligations he had to thoſe that kept the Crown upon his Head, and the Aſſurances he gave them, that the

Edicts

Edicts made and granted in their Favour, ſhould be inviolably obſerved; yet a Zeal for *Popery* was thought Reaſon ſufficient for cancelling and breaking through them. Nay perhaps his Intereſt and Ambition have both ſuffered through his Bigottry to that Religion. For he has rather choſe to ſee his Country diſpeopled of many hundred Thouſands of its Inhabitants, which muſt occaſion a great ſinking both of his Strength and of his Revenue, than ſuffer the *Proteſtants* in his Dominions. So that you bid me conſider, what Ties and Engagements we can bring a Bigot to the *Popiſh* Intereſt under, which he will not at any time break through hereafter, if he can ſerve the Cauſe of *Popery*. And he will think no greater Service can be done to *Popery*, than the extirpating the Hereſie (as they call it) of this *Nation* of ours, which has been ever ſince the *Reformation* the chief Support of it. Wherefore you think, no Peace can be a Security to us, which leaves him a Power to hurt either our Religion or our Liberties.

A powerful Neighbour of that Perſuaſion, you ſay, will never want a Pretence to fall upon us, if he can propoſe any Advantage by it. At a certain Prince's breaking with the *Dutch*, in 1692. *He was more Generous and Monarchical, than to aſſign Cauſe true or falſe for his Actions. He therefore publiſhed a Declaration of War without any Reaſons.* Only *the ill Satisfaction which His Majeſty hath of the Behaviour of the States-General towards him, being riſen to that*

degree, that he can no longer, without diminution
to his Glory diſſemble his Indignation
againſt them, &c. Therefore he hath
reſolved to make War againſt them
both by Sea and Land.

Growth of Popery, p. 38.

But by his Ambaſſador to the Pope, he declared, That he had not undertaken this War againſt the Hollanders, *but for extirpating of Hereſie. To the Emperor, that the* Hollanders *were a People who had forſaken God, were Hereticks, and that all good Chriſtians were in Duty bound to aſſociate for their Extirpation, and ought to pray to God for a Bleſſing upon ſo pious an Enterpriſe. And to other* Popiſh *Princes, that it was a War of* Religion, *and in order to the Propagation of the* Catholick *Faith.*

Now ſuch Reaſons as theſe, you think, our Neighbours will always have ready to give, and to juſtifie themſelves by, with regard to any Deſigns they may have upon a Proteſtant Nation.

But beſides, the Apprehenſions you have of the Dangers that may threaten us from Abroad, you likewiſe imagine that the State we are in at Home will mightily contribute to our undoing. There is ſo much Animoſity and Heat amongſt us, that one Side will hardly allow any thing to be reaſonable that is propoſed by the other. And whatever becomes of the Intereſt of the Nation, one ſeems reſolved at all Adventures to approve what the other condemns. You fancy that the *Tories* themſelves

would

would have very little liked the Terms we are entered in with *France*, had they not been ſo very much diſliked by the other Party. You think if the *Whigs* would have been quiet, and not have complained of Exorbitant Power and Greatneſs; the *Tories* of themſelves would have grown jealous of it. But while the one makes ſo much Clamour about it, the others will never grow ſenſible of it. And while the *Whigs* will be crying out of our Danger, the *Tories* will as long, out of pure Spight and Oppoſition, be declaring as loudly, that we are in the greateſt Safety. So that though you will allow that many of the *Tories* are not directly in a *French* Intereſt, or Favourers of the *Pretender*; yet you ſuppoſe, that they will hardly own any Meaſures neceſſary to be taken for our Security againſt them, if the *Whigs* do but offer to promote them. You ask then what hopes we can have of Safety, when the oppoſite Parties are not likely to agree about the Means which are neceſſary for our defence: But one Side ſeems determined in nothing ſo much as in acting and voting right or wrong againſt the other; and ſeem much more jealous of their Deſigns though never ſo innocent, and though tending in all appearance to the good of their Country, than they are of the Deſigns of *France*, or of the *P——r*. Such a Behaviour you obſerve it was that loſt *Carthage*, when it had it in its Power to vanquiſh the *Romans*. The Faction in that Common-Wealth, which oppoſed

poſed *Hannibal* and all his Meaſures, though you believe it was no more in a *Roman* Intereſt, than the *Tories* are now in a *French* or a *Popiſh* one, ſoon brought their State to ſuch a low Condition, that it was never able afterwards to recover it. And ſo you fear, ſuch a like Oppoſition among our ſelves, proceeding, it may be, as much from Pique and Reſentment, as from any other Motives, may, in Time, produce the like fatal Effects.

You bid me look about, and obſerve, how the Nation is carried away by a few Party-Words. The Name of the *Church* not only, you ſay, ſanctifies every Man that is pleaſed to aſſume it, and covers all his Vices, but all the Deſigns too, that are but pretended to be for its Service. And you think we can hardly be in any ſuch Danger from *France* or *Popery*, but that all fears may be baniſhed from the People, (except the Authority and places be in Popiſh Hands,) by giving out, that 'tis all *Whiggiſh*, *Presbyterian Cant*.

You tell me that you find Multitudes diſpoſed to give Credit to the worſt Characters that can be fix'd upon the *Whigs*, by the Repreſentations made of them in moſt of the late Addreſſes, Signed by Multitudes of Clergy and Laity; where they are univerſally declared to be Factious and Seditious, and never quiet or contented with any Government: Though you defie me to ſhew any Inſtance, where ſuch a Number of Men, ſo barbarouſly and unjuſtly treated for ſeveral Years together, not only

with

with the moſt foul and opprobrious Language; but with all other ill Uſage and Indignities that a hir'd Mob could throw upon them, have after all, carried themſelves with more Temper, and more like honeſt Men and good Chriſtians. They have, you acknowledge, taken all Opportunities as became them, not only to vindicate their own Innocence, and to ſhew how falſe the Aſperſions are, which were caſt upon them; but alſo upon all proper Occaſions, have been at the pains to convince Men, of the fatal tendency of ſome Proceedings, of their manifeſt Prejudice to the Intereſt of their Country, and of their ſerving a Cauſe, which all conſiderate Men ought to oppoſe with all their Might, if they value either their Religion or civil Rights. You think it the Duty of every Man, if he ſees any Miſchiefs coming upon a People, to forewarn them of their Danger, and if he finds they are betray'd by ill-deſigning Men, who wanted a Turn of Affairs to retrieve their deſperate Fortunes, and who are only making uſe of popular Arguments, to deceive the People to their undoing, it is as much his Duty to lay open their Deſigns, as it was of *Cicero*, to diſcover the Artifice and Treaſons of *Catiline*: And if after this, a Nation will ſuffer itſelf to be betray'd, they will have this Satisfaction, that they did all that was in their Power to prevent it.

But after all, you think it a very melancholy conſideration, that we live among People that are more Stupid and Incorrigible than former

former Ages ever produc'd, that will let any Untruths and Forgeries paſs upon them, if there are but profligate Writers, ſuch as the *Examiner* and *Poſt-Boy*, to diſperſe them, though they carry not with them ſo much as an Appearance of Probability. That ſuch a Fellow as *R—r* ſhould do any dirty Work, and lye in every Line, to make his Paper more acceptable to the Party, and to promote its Sale amongſt them, you don't ſeem much to wonder at: But that a Man of a liberal Education, as the Author of the *Examiner* appears to be, and perhaps a Clergyman, as ſome are of Opinion, ſhould proſtitute his Pen, to the vileſt Purpoſes, againſt the Convictions of his own Mind, you profeſs, is an Inſtance that you heretofore never expected to ſee in this Nation. But ſince one *Clergyman* was not only protected and upheld by Men of great Quality, as well as by thoſe of his own *Cloth*, in his inſolent Treatment of the *Revolution*, and the *Adminiſtration*, and alſo in his ſolemn Appeals to the Supream Being, even in defiance of the plaineſt Evidence in his own *Sermon*, to confront him; and was after this horrid Profanation, highly reverenced and advanced, to the eternal Reproach of the *Church* and Nation, that were both wonderfully preſerved by a Practice, which he took upon him to condemn: You think it not very amazing, if others of them, in hopes of faring as well, ſhould be as outragious upon the ſame *Topicks*.

Could

Could the *Examiner*, you think, have found ſuch a glaring Inſtance, not only of Contempt of Government, but of Sedition, and even of *Rebellion*, which then accompanied it, in all the Behaviour of the *Whigs*, or in any one of their Party, during all the Rudeneſs and Inſolence, that has been uſed of late Years everywhere towards them, he might have had one Fact to have charged them with, and have expatiated Ages upon it at his rate of Writing, without having recourſe to the *Jeſuitical* Arts of forging Falſhoods and Scandal, without ſo much as one Truth fairly repreſented to ſupport them.

Could he but have raiſed ſo much as a Suſpicion of a *Prime Miniſter* in the laſt *Reign*, or the late *Adminiſtration*, making a *DEAN*, in order, firſt to make him a thorough-pac'd Witneſs, and then to betray the greateſt *Heireſs* of the Kingdom into a Marriage with his *Son*, he need not have been ſcribling whole Reams againſt his Conſcience. Could he have taxed, you proceed, but my Lord *W——n*, with promoting to the firſt *Deanry* of *Ireland*, during his *Lieutenancy* there, a thorough *Latitudinarian* in every thing, one that had expos'd and ridiculed *Inſpiration*, and all Things ſerious, for no other Purpoſe, but that he was a fit Inſtrument for putting Colours upon the worſt Deſigns and Actions; how would he have triumph'd upon ſuch infamous Diſregard to the Honour and Intereſt of *Religion* and his Country. Or cou'd any of the Mercenary

Writers of the *Tory* Side, have produced a Liſt of 10 or 12 *L—ds*, all made and introduced into the Houſe of *P—rs* at the ſame Time, on purpoſe to alter the Senſe of one Part of the *Legiſlature*, in a Matter where the Welfare of the Nation and of all *Europe* was thought to be very nearly concerned; and could they have brought Inſtances of *Compacts* and *Alliances* broke in an arbitrary Manner by a *Whig Miniſtry*, only to proſecute ſome Selfiſh Views of their own, and to favour the Deſigns of our Enemies, without any ſort of regard to the Honour and Safety of their Country, or the Intereſt of their *Allies*, they might then with great Juſtice have inſulted the *Whigs* with the Baſeneſs and Treachery of their pretended *Patriots*, and have told with Boldneſs, how precarious the Conſtitution it ſelf, and the Property of every individual Member of the Community, was under ſuch a *Miniſtry*. Had the *Whigs* been carrying on under-hand, a *Treaty* and Correſpondence with *France*, at the ſame time that they openly promiſed their *Allies* to proſecute a vigorous War againſt her; or had they been ſecretly giving up *Kingdoms*, which they publickly engaged at the ſame time to fight for, till they were reſtored to their *Lawful* Owner, all the Paper that has been brutally ſpent in blackening and defaming them, had been, you think, much too little to ſet them off in their proper Colours.

But

But you defy, you ſay, any of the moſt inveterate Haters of the late *Miniſtry*, to alledge and prove any ſuch Acts of Treachery or Falſeneſs towards their *Allies* or their Country upon them; or even any Embezzling or Miſapplication of Publick *Money*; Clamours enough you'll own, there have been againſt them of this kind, and *five* and *Thirty Millions* was a Sum little enough to make the People believe they had cheated them of; tho' not a *Thouſandth* Part of one *Million* could ever yet be proved againſt them, notwithſtanding their Enemies have long had all the Means in their Hands of convicting them, had any Cheat been committed; and they did not want Inclination to bring them to condign Puniſhment.

It has, you ſay, been pretended, that theſe Embezzlers of ſo many *Millions*, had taken care to skreen themſelves from being called to Account by an *Act* of *Indemnity*. But this, you aſſure me, was an impudent Aſſertion, for the contrary is very apparent from the *Act* it ſelf, wherein 'tis expreſſed, that all ſuch ſhall be excepted from the Benefit of the *Act*, who are or ſhall be accountable for any *Publick Money*. And here you cry out upon the unparallel'd Impudence of the *Examiner*, and the Aſſurance of his *Pay-maſters*, who notwithſtanding they were confronted with the Tranſcript of the *Act*, which one would have thought ſufficient to ſilence the moſt aban-

don'd Creatures, above two Years ſince, do now again ſhamefully appeal to that very *Act*, as if made with deſign to ſhelter a Practice, which it as effectually provided againſt. But ſince a good part of the Nation, as you think, is in a diſpoſition to believe implicitly, whatever is but confidently aſſerted on one Side, there may, no doubt, be Wretches enough hir'd, as long as Money laſts, to ſpread about Falſhoods, tho' never ſo notorious, and to repeat them as often as it is neceſſary.

But you ſtill complain, that after all the Injuries done the *Whigs*, and all the falſe Charges brought againſt either their Practices or their Principles, the falſe Witneſſes againſt them exclaim, as if they alſo were barbarouſly uſed, by thoſe that only detect their Abuſes and Injuſtice, as if they had Characters and Denominations fix'd upon them, which were not fit to be beſtowed upon Men of Honour or Integrity.

This, you think, a Behaviour, though pretty extraordinary, yet very well fitting the *Tories*, to beſpatter thoſe afreſh, who will not ſuffer Indignities without complaining that they are unjuſt; who are reſolved to vindicate their Innocence, and not let falſe Accuſations lie upon them, though they cannot defend themſelves, but at the Expence of the Credit and Reputation of the wrongful Accuſers. If a Man is Perjur'd, that endeavours by a falſe Evidence to deprive you of your Life, Eſtate, or Reputation,

on, you ask, What you can do leſs, than give him that Character which is properly his due? But the uneaſineſſes you think ſhould be, not that one is called Raſcal or Villain, but that one is proved to be ſuch. And that this is the Caſe of moſt of the *Tory* Writers of late, you think is very manifeſt. They complained, you ſay, that *S——l* was called at his Tryal, *Incendiary*, and *Tool of a Party*, tho' at the ſame Time, they could not deny, that almoſt every Line in his Sermon declared him to be ſuch: But to charge Men of the greateſt Quality, and moſt unblemiſh'd Reputation, with Cheating and Plundering the Nation, not only without Evidence, but in oppoſition to the plaineſt Proofs to the contrary, is look'd upon as ſo laudable a Practice, that it meets with all fitting Encouragement from thoſe, who know themſelves to be moſt ſecure, while ſuch Reports can gain Credit; and you think there will always be enough employ'd in ſuch a Work, if they find it the moſt profitable Buſineſs they can undertake. So, you ſay, it was at *Rome*, during the Miniſtry and unbounded Power of *Sejanus*; a Party of baſe Fellows were always kept in Pay, to blacken and accuſe Men of the greateſt Probity, and the beſt deſerving of their Country. And though People were not ſo Credulous as they have been in ſome Ages ſince, but ſaw through the Deſign; yet Falſhood and Clamour, ſupported by Power, prevailed, to the trampling upon Vertue and Innocence, though they had generally

generally the Favour both of *Senate* and People.

But what, you ask, muſt, become of that State and Nation, where Power, and the Inclination of the People, is on the Side of Lyes and Calumnies, and where the Detection of the greateſt Injuries and Injuſtice is repreſented to be no better than Impudence and Defamation; where all Self-defence paſſes for Crimes, and denying falſe Charges and Accuſations, for *Sedition*?

Nay, you add, that People can ſuffer themſelves to be ſo far impos'd upon, that one Side may be guilty of as many Follies and Abſurdities as they pleaſe, yet if they ſhould chance to be diſcover'd and cenſur'd, while People are in a Humour of being led, they may be perſuaded, that the oppoſite Party, even the *Whigs*, were the Occaſions of them. So, you ſay, you find it, with relation to the *Peace*; though many *Tories* now think it not ſo advantageous a one, as they at firſt believ'd it, they have yet the Confidence to declare, that 'tis owing to the *Whigs* that it was no better: 'Tell them, that the *Whigs* did all that was in their Power to prevent its being made upon ſuch Conditions, that they ſhew'd the Inconveniences that muſt follow, upon leaving *Spain* in the Houſe of *Bourbon*, and giving ſuch Power to *France*, as ſuch Terms muſt give, in both Houſes of P——t and every where elſe, and ſhewed alſo, how Safe and

Honou-

Honourable a Peace we muſt have had, would we have acted in Concert with our Allies, and carried on the War but that Year, when we broke off from them, and had given Money ſufficient for carrying it on; tell them never ſo long that the *Whigs* bore their Teſtimony againſt all the Steps that were taken towards it, and tell them beſides, that had the *Whigs* been then in Power, the *French* King muſt have offer'd much better Terms, before they would ſo much as have hearkened to a *Treaty*, yet all you can ſay is to no purpoſe; the *Whigs* muſt have the Reputation of being the Occaſion of it. But what ever the preſent Age will believe, Poſterity, you are ſure, will be ſenſible, that had the *Whigs* continued in Power one Year longer, the P———r ſhould have ſcamper'd long before this Time a little further than *Lorrain*; the *French* ſhould have made much quicker Work with the Fortifications of *Dunkirk*; *Philip* ſhould have been ſent for Home, the *French* ſhould have had no Pretence to a Competition with us for the *Spaniſh* Trade; they ſhould have fiſh'd far enough from *New-found-land*, nor ſhould they have made any Prohibitions upon our *Home-Produce*, or *foreign Merchandizes*; they ſhould have allowed ſuch *Barriers* to the Empire, and the *United Provinces*, as they themſelves ſhould have been well ſatisfied with; ſhould have Conſented to ſuch Uſage of *Proteſtant* Subjects, as by the Laws of their Country, and of Chriſtianity

ſtianity in general, they thought they had a Title to; ſhould not only have owned the *Proteſtant Succeſſion* in the Houſe of *Hanover*, but have given better Security than Promiſes, that they would never offer to prevent or diſturb it: The poor *Catalans* ſhould not have been in any danger of loſing either their Eſtates or Liberties, for their Confidence in us, or Fidelity to their *lawful Prince*, nor ſhould the *Portagueſe* have complain'd of Breach of Faith, or have been in any Apprehenſion of becoming a Province to *Spain*, and then together with that, a Province to *France*.

Thus you pleaſe your ſelf with imagining, what would have been the Conſequences of *Whig Management*. And if the *Tories* Management had been the ſame, you aſſure me, you ſhould have celebrated it as much; ſince it is the Intereſt of your Country, and not of a Party, that you profeſs your ſelf concern'd for. And you would perſuade me, that there are great Numbers of *Whigs*, who, though they are inſulted as the *ruin'd Party*, and have indeed been great Loſers by the Uſage they have met with, yet would be very well contented to ſit ſtill under worſe, and give up all Expectations of Places or Employments, as long as the *Tories* themſelves ſhould think fit, provided they could be ſecur'd from the Dangers which they think ſtill threaten them; for whatever has or ſhould happen to them in

their

their private Intereſts or Fortunes, they would not own themſelves to be of the *ruined Party*, while they had hopes of retaining their *Liberty* and preſent *Conſtitution*.

But as the State of Affairs now ſeems, in your Opinion, to be both at Home or Abroad; the Nation ſo divided in its Opinions, concerning its own Intereſts, Multitudes ſo blinded, as not to ſee the Tendency either of their Principles or Practices; the Favourers and Friends of the *Revolution* in Diſgrace, and every where run down as the Peſts of the Nation; the *Jacobite* Doctrines preach'd, and receiv'd with Applauſe; and *Rebellion* charg'd with great Inſolence upon the whole Nation: Some though profeſſedly of the ſame Principles as to Liberty, and the *Hanover* Succeſſion, yet ſo deteſting *others*, that they would Sacrifice almoſt the whole, to their reſentments againſt them; an exorbitant *Power* Abroad, which will, in all probability, when a leſs gracious, and more politick *Prince* ſhall be on their Throne, be laying and executing Schemes to make us a *French* Province; our Trade receiving a great Shock, and ſtill fearing a greater; our Manufactures declining, and Multitudes of our Poor unimployed; by which means, they muſt either ſtarve, or become an unſupportable Burden on the Landed Intereſt; upon all which Accounts, you conclude, you can hardly ſee any other

Remedy's remaining, for repelling the Evil that muſt in Time be coming upon us, than what the *Tories* tell us we may uſe, and thoſe alone againſt *Tyranny* and *Arbitrary Power*, if they get amongſt us, and theſe are *Prayers* and *Tears*.

Thus, Sir, I have repeated at large, all the Reaſons you give for your horrible Apprehenſions. And I think, I may venture to aſſure you, that there is but one of them of any very great Conſequence. For if I can leſſen your Apprehenſions of foreign Danger, the others you mention, ariſing from our own Diſtractions, however they may give us uneaſineſs, will never of themſelves ruin us. And you muſt allow, that there is a Party ſtrong enough among our ſelves to prevent all the Deſigns of the *Papiſts* and *Jacobites*, and of all their ſecret Friends, if they are not ſupported from Abroad. So that if I can take off your Fears with Relation to that foreign exorbitant Power you ſo much dread, you muſt grant, that I have given you all imaginable Cauſe not to think our State deſperate. The Nation will rouſe itſelf, whenever it ſees its Danger, from *Popery* and *Tyranny*, if it is not overpower'd by a Force coming from without to their Aid.

And as there is but *one Power* that is in a Condition to do this; ſo if I can convince you that that *Power* will never Attempt any thing to your prejudice, I hope you will no more trouble

trouble your ſelf or me, with your melancholy Proſpects.

That *Power*, I grant you, may be juſtly formidable to all theſe Parts of the World, beſides our ſelves; but we have given it ſo much Cauſe to be our laſting Friend, that it can never become our Enemy. The Obligations we have laid upon the *French*, you in effect acknowledge your ſelf, when you ſay, that it was us that relieved them in that deſperate Eſtate, to which they were reduced, that it was us, who had we joined as vigorouſly the laſt *Campaign* with the Confederates, as we wiſely forſook them, could have obliged them to ſend for *Philip* out of *Spain*, to give up all the Conqueſts, Seizures, or Purchaſes of *threeſcore Years* paſt, to reſtore the *Proteſtants* to their Eſtates and Liberties, and to a free and unmoleſted Enjoyment of their *Religion*, and the *People* in general to their ancient *Rights* and *Privileges*. That we could have ſet Bounds to their Trade, and uſed that Language of the Scripture to them, *hitherto ſhall ye go and no further*; That it was us, in ſhort, while we were at the Head of the Confederacy, that could have preſcribed what Terms we thought fit, and the Enemy muſt have ſubmitted, without putting our ſelves to one Farthing more Expence, in all likelyhood, than we have otherwiſe done. If we then have been the Means of ſo much

good to *France*, and have prevented ſo many Calamities from falling upon *her*, as were then hanging over *her*, ſhe can never poſſibly forget the Services we have done her, and however able ſhe may be, ſhe can never be willing to hurt even an *hair of our Head*: So that you may baniſh all your *Fears*, the *Gratitude* of thoſe we have ſo much obliged, will ſecure you. So long as they can be pleaſed with the Thoughts of having *Spain* and the *Weſt-Indies* dependant upon them, of Commanding the Wealth and Trade of the World, and of preſcribing *Laws* to their Neighbours; ſo long, moſt certainly, muſt they remember to whom they are indebted for ſuch Favours: So that ſhould we live to ſee all the States of *Chriſtendome* brought under a *French* Yoke, and uſed beſides, as the *Proteſtants* of *France* have been, we may reſt ſatisfied that we have Merit enough to preſerve us unhurt or unmoleſted. You ſometimes fancy, that the *French* would, if they find themſelves able to do it, ſet the Pr——r on this Throne, but pray what Obligations can they have to the P——r, equal to what they have to this Nation, to move them to do it? If indeed they may find it will be obliging to us, they may then uſe their beſt Endeavours to effect it: But till that appears, ſurely they will remember their Obligations, and not attempt it.

But

But to keep up this Senſe of Obligation, and to render it perpetual, you ought to wiſh, that the preſent *Min——y* may always continue ; for Gratitude muſt certainly laſt, while thoſe that have done all the good Offices remain in Power. And indeed to what Purpoſe ſhould the *French* give you any diſturbance, or do you any Miſchief, while thoſe in the greateſt Places of Power and Authority, are ſuch as they have no Reaſon to diſlike? What ſhould the *French* deſire more, than to have ſuch Meaſures and Deſigns purſued as are moſt for their Advantage? So that for your own Sakes, and for keeping the *French* from ever attempting any thing to your Prejudice, be ſure to keep down all Clamours or Complaints that may ſhake the preſent *Min —y*, always remembring how much depends upon *French* Gratitude, and the Obligations that *Nation* has to ſome *Peoples* Management.

But if indeed you ſhould be ſo far infatuated, as to offer to change Hands, and diſpoſſeſs thoſe in Power, thoſe Obligations may be thought to be no longer binding: Nay, perhaps it may be thought a Peice of Gratitude, to employ a Power for their Service, who before put it into his hands. And the *French* may be ſo far provoked as to puniſh the Affront offered to their Friends upon the whole *Nation*. For as they will have vaſt Forces to employ upon what Expedition they

ſhall

ſhall think fit, ſo it will depend in a great Meaſure upon our Behaviour, whether or not they ſhall be let looſe upon us.

So that if you have a Mind to put a full end to your own and other Peoples Fears, and to be no longer apprehenſive of Danger, from the Greatneſs and Policy of your *French* Neighbours, be continually thinking of the laſting Obligations you have laid upon them, and of the great Reaſons you have to perſuade your ſelf, they will never forget them. But if this one Conſideration is not ſufficient to quiet you; there is no other Argument that I know how to make uſe of, which will be able to do it,

I am,

SIR,

Your moſt Obedient

Humble Servant.

FINIS.